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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude 
Rhoades, deceased, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT 
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14159 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death 
of Claude Rhoades. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash 
service of process, held that attachment is an improper 
method to confer jurisdiction in a wrongful death case 
where the tort sued upon arose in another state and pursuant 
to this holding granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to 
vacate the writ of attachment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court reversed, the writ of attachment reinstated and 
the case remanded for a trial on the merits. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts giving rise to this case are as follows: 
Plaintiff's decedent, Claude Rhoades, lived about 
three-quarters of a mile on the Utah side of the Utah-
Colorado border. He was a farmer and farmed land that he 
owned in Utah and land that he leased in Utah and Colorado. 
(R.44) 
Defendant James Wright lived about two miles on the 
Colorado side of the Colorado-Utah border with his parents, 
Clifford Wright and Essie Wright, who are also Defendants. 
James Wright farmed land belonging to himself and his 
parents, both in Colorado and Utah. The properties of the 
parties were in close proximity. (R.44) 
Claude Rhoades had been married to a cousin of James 
Wright, from whom he was divorced in 1966. The property 
settlement provided that Anita, the first Mrs. Rhoades, was 
to receive a share of the profits from crops grown on certain 
land. The parties had been keeping an eye on each other as 
regards the success or failure of the crops, who visited 
whom and so on. (R.44-45) 
In the late afternoon of April 19, 1970, the parties 
were all inspecting portions of their farmland, Claude 
Rhoades with his second wife, Mildred Rhoades, Appellant 
herein, and James Wright with his parents, Clifford and 
Essie Wright. Claude Rhoades overtook the Wrights and 
'
:
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pulled his pickup over in such a way as to make them stop. 
He and Appellant got out of the truck and approached the 
Wright vehicle on the driver's side. Claude Rhoades spoke 
to James Wright words to the effect of "Get off my back." 
Thereupon, James Wright shot and killed Claude Rhoades. At 
the time of the shooting, the parties were on the Colorado 
side of the Utah-Colorado border. (R.45) 
After James Wright was found guilty of first degree 
murder by a Colorado court and jury and was sentenced to 
life imprisonment, he transferred his Utah property to his 
parents for no consideration. (R.45) Plaintiff then filed 
this wrongful death action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, as a 
diversity action. The Defendants were served with process 
in Colorado. The Plaintiff also sought and obtained a writ 
of attachment on the Utah property that James Wright had 
transferred to his parents. (R.45) 
The United States District Court found, based on the 
Utah long-arm statute, that the court had personal jurisdic-
tion over the Defendants. The case was then certified for 
interlocutory appeal. (R.46) 
The federal district court's conclusion that there 
was personal jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm statute, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 Supp., 78-27-24, was based on its 
view that economic injury in Utah which resulted from the 
3 
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shooting in Colorado was sufficient to support such 
jurisdiction. The trial court also stated that the exercise 
of jurisdiction would not violate due process standards 
because it was reasonably foreseeable that the act would 
cause injury in Utah and it was fair in view of the contacts 
the Defendant had with Utah. (R.46) 
The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
reversed the decision of the district court, with directions 
to dismiss the action by reason of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion for the reason that the Utah long-arm statute does not 
contemplate "economic injury" as a basis for personal 
jurisdiction. (R.47-48) 
The circuit court further held that jurisdiction could 
not be sustained by the attachment of Defendant's property 
in Utah for the same reason that the matter of "injury to 
the person" or "personal injury" is required rather than 
"economic injury." (R.48-49) The Tenth Circuit decision 
was filed July 23, 1973. 
Effective November 1, 1972, subsequent to the ruling 
of the United States District Court, and while that decision 
was before the circuit court on appeal, Rule 64C(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, was amended by this Court to read 
as follows: (R.32) 
(a) The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of 
the complaint . . . in an action against a non-
resident of this state, may have the property of the 
4 
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defendant, not exempt from execution, attached as 
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that 
may be recovered in such action. . . . (Emphasis 
added) 
The amendment substituted the phrase "against a non-resident" 
for the phrase "to recover damages for any tort committed 
by a non-resident of this state against the person or 
property of a resident of this state" near the beginning of 
the rule, (R.32) 
On July 29, 1974, Plaintiff-Appellant filed her 
complaint herein individually and as Administratrix of the 
Estate of Claude Rhoades, deceased. (R.l) 
Without discussing the effect of the amendment to Rule 
64C(a), the lower court granted Defendants1 motion to quash 
service of process on the Defendants, stating as its reason 
the fact that the Defendants are all residents of Colorado 
and were served in that state and Utah's long-arm statute 
does not offer a basis for in personam jurisdiction where 
the claim is for economic injury. (R.61-62) 
In addition, the trial court found that attachment is 
an improper method to confer jurisdiction in a wrongful 
death case where the tort sued upon arose in another state 
and therefore concluded that it did not have in rem 
jurisdiction. (R.62) The district court further found that 
the prior decision of the federal circuit court regarding 
jurisdiction "may not be res judicata by reason of the 
amendment which has been made" by this Court to Rule 64C(a). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Subsequently, on ex parte motion of Defendants, and 
by order dated June 3, 1975, the lower court vacated the 
writ of attachment herein, stating that the writ was 
"without legal significance as far as a means of conferring 
in rem jurisdiction" on the court by virtue of the court's 
order and decision dated May 21, 1975. (R.64-65) 
ISSUES 
1. Rule 64C(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
entitles the Plaintiff in this action to attach the property 
of Defendants within the State of Utah and confers in rem 
or quasi in rem jurisdiction on the Utah courts, by virtue 
of Plaintiff's attachment and action, to determine the 
rights of Defendants in the subject property. 
2. The federal court's decision that it lacked 
jurisdiction is not res judicata as to the instant action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RULE 64C(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ENTITLES 
THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS ACTION TO ATTACH THE PROPERTY OF 
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH AND CONFERS IN REM OR 
QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION ON THE UTAH COURTS, BY VIRTUE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTACHMENT AND ACTION, TO DETERMINE THE RIGHTS 
OF DEFENDANTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in pertinent part as follows: 
6 
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(a) The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of 
the complaint . . • in an action against a non-resident 
of this state, may have the property of the defendant, 
not exempt from execution, attached as security for 
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered 
in such action. . . . (Emphasis added) 
The amendment to Rule 64C(a), effective November 1, 
1972, substituted "against a non-resident" for "to recover 
damages for any tort committed by a non-resident of this 
state against the person or property of a resident of this 
state." It is Plaintiff's position that the Utah Supreme 
Court intended to broaden the scope of the attachment rule 
to include "economic injury." 
Rule 64C(a) as amended is consistent with the trend 
in other states to extend jurisdiction to allow a resident 
to recover in the courts of his own state in any action 
against a non-resident not amenable to process in that state, 
where the defendant owns property within the state and where 
the cause of action, regardless of whether it sounds in tort 
or contract, may have arisen in another state. See N.Y. Civ. 
Prac. Act, §6201 (1963); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 
N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966); 111. Ann. Stat. C. 11 
§11 (1963); Ind. Ann. Stat. 34-1-11-1 [ 3-501] (1946) 
See, also, Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 
1973); Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. 
Rptr. 390 (1973); Forbes v. Boynton, N.H. , 313 A.2d 
129 (1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. §571.41 subd. 2 (Supp. 1974). 
The law of attachment varies from state to state. 
7 
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Several generalizations are possible, however, because of 
the common historical development of the remedy. Attachment 
is the process by which property is brought into the custody 
of the court. It is used both as a means of securing a 
potential judgment debt and as a means of acquiring 
jurisdiction over the defendant to the extent of the 
property attached. Both of these aspects are relied upon 
in the present action. If the Plaintiff's claim matures 
into a judgment, the court may cause Defendants' attached 
property to be sold to satisfy the judgment. In this manner 
the Plaintiff effectively acquires jurisdiction over the 
Defendants who may otherwise not be amenable to process in 
the state. 
The right of a state, through its tribunals, to subject 
property situated within its limits, owned by non-residents, 
to the payment of demands against them and the fact that this 
jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of 
the state where the owners are domiciled are too well 
established to admit of argument; and attachment laws 
directed against citizens of other states have been declared 
by uniform course of decisions to be valid and not in 
conflict with constitutional guarantees. 6 AM. JUR. 2d, 
Attachment and Garnishment, §219 (2d Ed. 1963). 
In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), 
the Supreme Court held that a state may subject property 
8 
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situated in its territory, but owned by non-residents, to 
the payment of claims by its own citizens. This jurisdiction 
affecting non-residents was found permissible because it did 
not infringe upon the sovereignty of the state in which the 
owner was domiciled. The court also recognized the interest 
of each state in the protection of its own citizens. These 
two factors were found to legitimate the exercise of authority 
of a state to hold and appropriate for the satisfaction of 
claims of residents1 property owned by non-residents. The 
due process standard for the assertion of jurisdiction 
formulated in Pennoyer provides a reliable objective test 
for determining whether any particular exercise of jurisdic-
tion is constitutional. Where the property attached is 
physically located within the state, the due process require-
ment is satisfied. 
In a sense, when the Supreme Court approved this 
practice in Pennoyer, it made the attachment statutes the 
first long-arm statutes. 
The doctrine has now been extended to authorize courts 
to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by attaching as property 
of a non-resident his right under a liability policy to have 
his insurer defend and indemnify him on his claim. Seider v. 
feoth, supra; Rintala v. Shoemaker, supra; Forbes v. Boynton, 
supra. 
It is not necessary to personally serve the defendants 
9 
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in order to acquire in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction 
over defendants1 property located within the state. In the 
present case, the Defendants were given notice, by means of 
personal service of the complaint upon them, that their 
property had been attached and that a proceeding in rem or 
quasi-in-rem had been commenced against their property to 
satisfy Plaintiff's claim. For that reason, it was error 
for the court to quash service of process, even though 
personal service may have failed to confer personal jurisdic-
tion over the Defendants. 
In their memorandum submitted to the court below, the 
Defendants relied upon the case of Alpers v. New Jersey Bell 
Telephone Company, 403 Pa. 626, 130 A.2d 360 (1961), as 
authority for their argument that because the cause of action 
arose in another state, Utah is precluded from using Rule 
64C(a) as a means of conferring in rem or quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction. (R.25) In stating their argument, Defendants 
conceded that they had found only limited authority on this 
proposition. (R.25) 
In the Alpers case, the plaintiff, a resident of 
Pennsylvania, was injured in New Jersey in an automobile 
accident allegedly caused by a truck owned by defendant and 
driven by one of its employees. Plaintiff attached the 
property of defendant in Pennsylvania and brought an action 
for damages. Defendant appeared specially for purposes of 
10 
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contesting jurisdiction, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
upheld the lower court's ruling dismissing the writ of 
attachment, stating that the attachment remedy will not lie 
for torts committed outside the boundaries of the State of 
Pennsylvania. 
In stating the facts of the Alpers case, the Defendants 
ignored the fact that that decision was based on a 1937 
Pennsylvania statutory provision which limited writs of 
foreign attachment to torts committed within the State of 
Pennsylvania. That decision was subsequently criticized in 
a persuasive law review comment. That comment cited a 
Pennsylvania statute that authorizes the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania to prescribe forms of action, writs and other 
rules of civil procedure for the courts of Pennsylvania. 
See Vol. XIX Washington and Lee Law Review, Attachment for 
a Foreign Tort, p.267 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 §61 
(Supp. 1960). Under this statutory authority, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania adopted its Rule 1252 which provides 
in part that a writ of foreign attachment may issue to attach 
property of a defendant upon any cause of action at law or 
in equity in which the relief sought includes a judgment or 
decree for the payment of money. The author of that article 
further commented that Pennsylvania's Rule 1252 does not 
affect any fundamental change in the basic requirements for 
proceeding by attachment. Prior to obtaining a writ of 
11 
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foreign attachment in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant is a non-resident of the state and that 
tangible property belonging to the defendant is within the 
forum when the attachment is served upon the garnishee. 
Upon meeting these requirements, the writ of foreign attach-
ment will issue and a suit quasi in rem is formally instituted 
whereby the plaintiff may proceed against the property of 
the defendant, rather than against the defendant's person. 
The author suggested that the doctrine of forum non-conveniens 
could be applied by the court to effectively control the use 
of the writ of attachment in actions to recover for foreign 
torts and further commented as follows: 
At the same time, the plaintiff who asserts a good 
cause of action and seeks recovery by attachment would 
not be denied all access to the courts of Pennsylvania. 
It would seem that under the Alpers decision, a 
resident must either seek recovery in personam within 
or without the commonwealth since there is little 
chance the plaintiff can obtain personal service upon 
the foreign defendant. The desirability of reducing 
burdensome litigation does not appear to warrant the 
harsh restriction that denies the fundamental quasi 
in rem action, especially when the same results may 
be more equitably achieved by a discretionary use of 
the doctrine of forum non-conveniens. 
The efficacy and desirability of the writ of foreign 
attachment as extended to foreign actions ex delicto 
has been well recognized and accepted in other jurisdic-
tions. It is submitted that a decision interpreting 
Rule 1252 so as to extend to foreign actions ex delicto 
would have been preferable. The application of the 
rule could then have been made to depend on the 
discretionary doctrine of forum non-conveniens. See 
Volume XIX, Washington and Lee Law Review, Attachment 
for a Foreign Tort, at pages 270-271 (1962). 
12 
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The Utah Supreme Court is authorized by Section 78-2-4, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), to: 
. . . [P]rescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all 
courts of the State of Utah, the forms of process, 
writs, pleadings and motions and the practice and 
procedure in all civil and criminal actions and 
proceedings. . . . Such rules may not abridge, enlarge 
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
Unlike the State of Pennsylvania, Utah does not have a 
statute which limits writs of foreign attachment to torts 
committed within the state. There is no basis for holding 
that Rule 64C(a) does not allow such a practice. The rule 
is broad and unrestricted in that regard. 
This Court has long recognized the principle of in 
rem jurisdiction with regard to attachment proceedings. In 
the case of Bristol v. Brent, 36 Utah 108, 103 Pac. 1076 
(1909)f the court held as follows with regard to attachment 
proceedings against a non-resident defendant and in rem 
jurisdiction: 
In attachment proceedings against a non-resident 
defendant where prsonal service on him is lacking, it 
is elementary that the court must obtain jurisdiction 
of the property of the defendant. This in an ordinary 
attachment is obtained by seizure of it by the officer, 
and the seizure places the property in the custody of 
the law to be so held until the court determines 
whether or not the plaintiff in the action is entitled 
to judgment in the main case. When this is determined 
and judgment is entered, then, and then only, can the 
property that has been seized be applied to the payment 
of the judgment. 
* * * 
A proceeding by which jurisdiction is sought by 
13 
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attaching property, whether tangible or intangible, 
such as a debt, is essentially a proceeding in rem; 
that is, a proceeding against a thing which is brought 
into the custody of the law and hence-within the 
jurisdiction of the court. To place it into the 
custody of law and bring it within the jurisdiction of 
the court, the things which the law requires to be 
done must be done. 
See, also, 6 AM. JUR. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment, 
§14, §16, §219 (2d Ed. 1963). 
The Affidavit for Attachment in the present action 
clearly states a basis for in rem jurisdiction as follows: 
And this affiant further states that the following 
cause for issuing an attachment in this action actually 
exists at the time of taking this affidavit, to-wit: 
That the said defendants are non-residents of the 
State of Utah; that the defendant James C. Wright has 
assigned and disposed of real property in the State 
of Utah with intent to defraud his creditors; and that 
unless this attachment issue, said defendants, and 
each of them, will further attempt to assign and 
transfer real property located in the State of Utah 
for the purpose of avoiding the payment of the 
obligation herein sued upon, and particularly the 
obligation owing to plaintiff; that in order to obtain 
jurisdiction of the matter, it is necessary that the 
court issue a writ of attachment, retaining and holding 
in tact said property for the purpose of satisfying in 
whole or in part any judgment which may be rendered in 
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, or either 
of them. (R.56) 
The complaint of Plaintiff also clearly states a cause 
of action sounding in rem or quasi-in-rem against the 
Defendants and their property. (R.l-3) 
For the above stated reasons, it was error for the 
trial court to hold that Plaintiff's attachment failed to 
confer in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on the court and 
the court improperly granted Defendants1 ex parte motion to 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vacate the writ of attachment. 
POINT II 
THE FEDERAL COURT'S DECISION THAT IT LACKED JURISDICTION IS 
NOT RES JUDICATA AS TO THE INSTANT ACTION. 
The general rule is that a judgment for the defendant 
based on lack of jurisdiction does not bar the plaintiff 
from bringing another action on the same cause in another 
court having jurisdiction. 46 AM. JUR. 2df Judgments, §500, 
p.656 (2d Ed. 1969). 
46 AM. JUR. 2d, supra, further states the law as follows: 
. . . [E]ven though a judgment disposes of the action 
without a determination of the merits of the cause of 
action, it is nevertheless conclusive as to the issues 
or technical points actually decided therein, and this 
rule has been applied to a judgment based on want of 
jurisdiction, so as to render conclusive the prior 
court's determination of its lack of jurisdiction, as 
well as questions material to the issue of jurisdiction 
and actually decided by the judgment. Under this rule, 
a subsequent action by and against the same parties on 
the same cause in the same court is barred, but the 
maintenance of a subsequent action in another court is 
not precluded by a prior judgment based on the 
determination of a lack of jurisdiction, even if such 
determination is erroneous, although, as to this precise 
point, there is some authority to the contrary. 
(Emphasis added) 
Of course, a judgment based on lack of jurisdiction 
does not preclude a party from litigating in another 
action a question not determined by the judgment, such 
as a jurisdictional question not identical with the 
one decided by the former judgment. . . . (Emphasis 
added) 
Literally, res judicata means a matter adjudged; a 
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter 
settled by judgment. As stated in many cases, the doctrine 
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of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered 
upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action 
and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties 
and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any 
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 46 AH JUR, supra 
There is no issue or matter now before this Court that 
has been decided by prior judgment by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
As noted previously, the circuit court merely held I 
that the federal district Court lacked personal jurisdiction 1 
over the Defendants to the extent personal jurisdiction was 
sought under Utah's long-arm statute. The court also found 
that "jurisdiction" could not be sustained by the attachment 
i 
of Defendants' property under Utah's attachment Rule 64C I 
[as that rule read prior to amendment]. 1 
The lower court in the present action found that the 
prior decision of the federal court in this case regarding ] 
jurisdiction may not be res judicata by reason of the amend-
ment which has been made by this Court to Rule 64C(a). I 
(R.63) Then, without citing any authority, the lower court i 
found that attachment is an improper method to confer 
jurisdiction in a wrongful death case where the tort sued I 
upon arose in another state. (R.62-63) The rest of the 
1 
court's decision deals with construction of the Utah long- | 
i 
i 
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arm statute which has no application in the present action. 
(R.61-62) 
Defendants in their memorandum of authorities before 
the lower court present considerable argument on the questions 
of res judicata and interpretation of the Utah long-arm 
statute, both of which are without merit under the facts of 
this case. 
Plaintiff in the present action claims nothing by way 
of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants by virtue of 
Utah's long-arm statute. Admittedly, if Plaintiff were so 
asserting, the same may be res judicata since the federal 
court already decided that question. The federal court also 
interpreted Rule 64C(a) as it read prior to amendment and 
did so in connection with its interpretation of the Utah 
long-arm statute. The federal court concluded that neither 
the long-arm statute nor Rule 64C(a)[as it then read] 
included economic injury. 
A. A change in the law between the commencement 
dates of the federal action and the state action precludes 
the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
It is a well established principal of law that a 
change in circumstances, either law or fact, precludes 
application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
50 C.J.S., Judgments, §650, p.95, states the law as 
follows: 
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In accordance with the general rule stated supra this 
section that the estoppel of a judgment extends only 
to the facts and conditions as they were at the time 
the judgment was rendered, it has been broadly held 
that res judicata is no defense where, between the 
time of the first judgment and the second, there has 
been an intervening decision or a change in the law 
creating an altered situation, as where the second suit 
seeks an adjudication of rights under a statute enacted 
subsequent to the determination of the first action. 
Accord 49 ALR2d 1036, 1039-40; 
Consequently, the judgment is conclusive in another 
proceeding as to questions material to the jurisdiction 
of the court rendering it, but it is not conclusive . 
. . where, subsequently to the rendition of the 
judgment, there has been a change . . . in the governing 
statutes or rules of court. 
As already discussed, Rule 64C(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, was amended between the commencement of the federal 
court action and the commencement of the instant state court 
action. For that reason, the federal court decision inter-
preting the old Rule 64C(a) in connection with the long-arm 
statute has no binding effect on the present action which 
was initiated under the new Rule 64C(a). 
It is also the general rule that amendments to 
procedural statutes will be liberally construed. 1A Souther-
land Statutory Construction, §22.9 (4th Ed. 1972). 
In the absence of a saving clause or statute or some 
other clear indication that legislative intent is to the 
contrary, provisions added by the amendment that affect 
procedural rights—legal remedies—are construed to apply 
to all cases pending at the time of its enactment and all 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
those commenced subsequent thereto, whether the substantive 
right sought to be enforced thereby accrued prior or sub-
sequent to the amendment, unless a vested right would thereby 
be impaired. 1A Southerland Statutory Construction, §22.36 
(4th Ed. 1972). 
A fortiori, a statutory amendment which furnishes a 
new remedy, but does not impair or affect any contractual 
obligations or disturb any vested rights, is applicable to 
proceedings begun after its passage, though relating to an 
accident previous thereto. 73 AM. JUR. 2d, Statutes, §354 
(2d Ed. 1974) . 
In Shelby-Downard Asphalt Co. v. Enyart, 670 Okl. 237, 
170 Pac. 708 (1918), the plaintiff brought the same action 
three different times against defendant for personal injuries 
sustained in a construction accident. All three actions 
were commenced in the same county, the situs of the injury. 
Action No. 1 was commenced in March, 1912, and on defendant's 
motion to quash service of process the court ruled that it 
lacked in personam jurisdiction over defendant and dismissed 
the action without prejudice. The basis for the court's 
decision was an Oklahoma statute permitting a plaintiff to 
bring a personal injury action against a corporation only 
in the county where the defendant corporation has its 
principal place of business, which in that case happened to 
be a county other than the county where the injury took 
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place. In August, 1912, plaintiff commenced Action No. 2, 
identical to Action No. 1, in the same county; and the court 
dismissed it again for the same reason. Then, in March, 
1913, the foregoing statute was amended in order to permit 
actions against corporations to be commenced in the county 
where the plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff then commenced 
Action No. 3, identical to Actions Nos. 2 and 3 except for 
the change in the statutory law; and this time the court 
denied defendant's motion to quash. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding the amendment procedural, and there-
fore retroactive in application, and also holding that the 
change in the law precluded defendant from successfully 
asserting the doctrine of res judicata as a bar to the suit. 
Hence, under the well-established rule that a statute 
which applies to procedure only should be given a 
retrospective effect, unless it appears that the 
Legislature intended it should operate prospectively 
only, we think this act should be construed to embrace 
causes of action existing at the time the act went 
into effect, as well as those that should arise there-
after. 
The plaintiff in error next contends that it was res 
adjudicata for the court to assume jurisdiction of 
this case in Osage County after it had previously 
entered a judgment dismissing the case, on the ground 
that Osage County was the wrong venue. But this 
contention is not tenable. For it does not follow 
that because Osage County was the wrong venue at the 
time the first action was commenced, that Enyart would 
be precluded from bringing the action again in the 
same county, provided conditions so changed as to make 
that the proper venue. . . . And . . . the procedure 
so changed while the cause of action was still alive 
as to make Osage County the proper venue. And under 
these conditions the court, in passing upon the motion 
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to dismiss in the instant case, had an entirely 
different question before it to that presented by the 
motion to dismiss in the former case. 170 Pac. at 710. 
In the case of Barry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d 
1010 (1961), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the redefini-
tion of the practice of dentistry was within the police power 
of the legislature and did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or deprive dental technicians of a valuable property 
right without due process. In reaching this result, the 
court also found that the doctrine of res judicata is not 
applicable where the law under which the first adjudication 
was obtained was different from that applicable to the second 
action; 
The contention by appellants that the doctrine of res 
judicata is applicable here by reason of Barry v. 
Summers, supra, is without merit. This court there 
considered the 19 53 amendment and held it unconstitu-
tional. The present action concerns the provisions 
of . . . amending the definition of "practice of 
dentistry.11 The previous case cannot be expanded to 
prohibit subsequent legislative action. The doctrine 
of res judicata is not applicable where the law under 
which the first adjudication was obtained is different 
from that applicable to the second action. 
Rule 64C(a), a procedural rule, applies to all actions 
pending at the time it was amended, as well as to actions 
commenced after its amendment. 
I n
 Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 (1974), 
one of the issues was whether Rule 64C (f) (1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure applied retroactively. The facts 
indicate that plaintiff had attached defendant's property 
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in August, 1972. Defendant furnished a $10,000.00 bond and 
in March, 1973, made a motion to release his property. The 
trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff objected to the 
motion, arguing that defendant was required to furnish a 
bond equal in value to the property to be released, which 
was approximately $170,000.00. The basis of the controversy 
was an amendment to Rule 64C(f), issued by the Utah Supreme 
Court on November 1, 1972, stating that a defendant must 
furnish a bond "in a sum not less than the value of the 
property to be released," which supplanted the former maximum 
$10,000.00 requirement. Plaintiff argued the amendment 
applied retroactively. The trial court ruled for defendant, 
but the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that: 
Rule 64C(f), U.R.C.P., is primarily designed to secure 
plaintiff's claim; the provision in the former rule, 
limiting the maximum value of defendant's bond, does 
not appear within the context of the rule to confer a 
substantive right upon the defendant. The trial court 
erred in its ruling that the amended rule was not 
applicable in the instant action. 519 P.2d 239. 
Applying the court's reasoning to the amendment to 
Rule 64C(a), the former provision does not appear to confer 
a substantive right upon the defendant that would be impaired 
by retrospective application of the amendment. The amendment 
clarifies the original intent of the rule and provides 
Plaintiff with a forum in which to pursue her claim. 
Along a similar vein are those cases holding that the 
long-arm statutes apply retroactively. Such cases are 
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particularly relevant to the instant case because they stand 
for the proposition that a statute that provides more 
circumstances for in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant is retroactive in effect. 
In the case of Merme's v. Weeden and Co., 8 Ariz. App. 
166, 444 P.2d 524 (1968), the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that the New York long-arm statute has retroactive effect. 
That case concerned a dispute over the sale of stock. The 
court held as follows: 
The above-mentioned statute was to become effective 
September 1, 196 3. The sale of the stock in question 
occurred the previous April of 196 3. The first question, 
therefore, would be to determine whether the act applies 
to the instant case. We believe so. The New York 
court has held that the statute is procedural and one 
which merely makes available an additional forum to 
plaintiff to enforce whatever substantive right he 
might have against a defendant, and, as such, may be 
applied retroactively. 444 P.2d at 526. 
Accord, Gordon v. Granstedt, 513 P.2d 165 (Hawaii 1973). 
The same function is being served by Rule 64C(a), as 
amended. It merely adds an additional circumstance, that 
of "economic injury," to those of direct injuries to person 
or property, under which plaintiffs can obtain quasi-in-rem 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. It also eliminates 
bothersome language which might be construed to restrict the 
attachment remedy and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to actions 
arising within the state. The new Rule 64C(a) imposes no 
restrictions in that regard and clearly applies to actions 
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arising in other states. 
CONCLUSION * 
It was error for the court below to grant Defendants' 
motion to quash service of process for the reason that 
personal service was necessary to give the Defendants notice 
that their property had been attached and that a proceeding 
in rem or quasi-in-rem had been commenced against the property 
to satisfy the claim of Plaintiff, 
The lower court likewise erred by granting Defendants1 
ex parte motion to vacate the writ of attachment. 
Based on the foregoing argument, Plaintiff had a valid 
writ of attachment by virtue of which quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion was conferred on the court to determine the interest of 
Plaintiff in Defendants1 property pursuant to Plaintiff's 
claim. 
If this Court were to hold otherwise, Plaintiff would 
be denied her only remaining forum, since the statute of 
limitations has run in Colorado and Colorado does not have 
a savings clause similar to Utah, with regard to the statute 
of limitations applicable to wrongful death actions. This 
matter was decided by the Colorado court on April 16, 1975, 
in an action almost identical to the present action, filed 
by the Plaintiff in Dolores County, Colorado, on July 29, 
1974. Plaintiff's case has yet to be heard on the merits. 
This is certainly a case which warrants liberal 
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interpretation of Rule 64C(a) in view of the many contacts 
of Defendants with Utah, the close proximity of the parties1 
properties and the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that Defendant's act would cause injury in Utah. 
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in the Utah court in this 
action in no way infringes upon the sovereignty of Colorado. 
It recognizes the interest of Utah in the protection of its 
own citizens. These two factors legitimate the exercise of 
authority by Utah to hold and appropriate for the satisfaction 
of Plaintiff's claim property owned by non-residents where 
that property is physically present in Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD & 
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